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INTRODUCTION
In constitutionally endorsing the affirmative action program at the
University of Michigan Law School, the Court once and for all
legitimated the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke's' diversity
rationale as a permissible compelling state interest to justify race-based
affirmative action.2 This compelling interest is significant in that it permits
race to be used narrowly as one among many factors to determine
t 2004 by Maurice R. Dyson. All rights reserved.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law; A.B. 1995, Columbia College; J.D. 1999, Columbia University School of Law. The
author thanks Dean Attanasio and the faculty of law at Southern Methodist University.
Special thanks to Professors Darren Hutchinson and Pamela Bridgewater for their valuable
guidance and support as well as Jane Dolkart for her helpful comments with this work.
Thanks is extended to Roy Anderson, Gregory Crespi, Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Mila
Davis-Dyson, Gant Grimes and to my mother, MaryAnne Lee, who endured much and
taught me more. I dedicate this Article to my brother William Dyson, who I regret life
never gave me the opportunity to know.
1. 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (noting the diversity rationale is grounded in the First
Amendment's protection of a level of academic freedom, including a school's "right to
select those students who will contribute the most to" the school's goal of providing a
"robust exchange of ideas").
2. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003). The law school program was
upheld by a vote of 5-4, with Justice Sandra Day O'Connor providing the swing vote by
siding with more liberal jurists. However, in Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003), the
University of Michigan's undergraduate program was overturned by a vote of 6-3. Taken
as a collective whole, the impact of the two rulings will force universities and schools to
abandon rigid systems as they sort through applications of prospective students.
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student admission eligibility.3 But with the pronouncement of this
holding, six justices made clear that the Court expects that twenty-five
years from now (fifty years since Bakke was decided), the consideration of
race in admissions will no longer be necessary to further the interest of
diversity.4
Shortly after the Court's decision, California voters similarly con-
templated the fate of race in the Racial Privacy Initiative ("RPI"). The
initiative represented the most far-reaching bid by anti-affirmative action
critic Ward Connerly to once and for all remove the consideration of race
from all corners of state government.' However, despite considerable
funds and effort expended by proponents, the RPI was roundly defeated
by a fairly large margin of voters. Approximately 5,483,343 or 63.9%
voted against the initiative and 3,104,721 or 36.1% voted in favor of it.
6
What do these decisions by the high Court and the largest state electorate
portend for the future of racial classification and racial justice? At the
heart of this inquiry are the questions of how we should define the role of
3. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325.
4. Id. at 2346.The Court noted that it:
take[s] the Law School at its word that it would "like nothing better than to
find a race-neutral admissions formula" and will terminate its race-conscious
admissions program as soon as practicable.... [and that it] expect[s] that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to
further the interest approved today.
Id.
For the majority, the necessity for some finality to all race conscious admissions
programs "assure[s] all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of all
racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken in the service of the goal
of equality itself." Id. (citing Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,510 (1989) (plu-
rality opinion)); see also Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Casimir J. Bartnik, The Constitutionality
of Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 CHI. B. REc. 282, 293
(1977). Nathanson and Bartnik observe that:
It would be a sad day indeed, were America to become a quota-ridden soci-
ety, with each identifiable minority assigned proportional representation in
every desirable walk of life. But that is not the rationale for programs of pref-
erential treatment; the acid test of their justification will be their efficacy in
eliminating the need for any racial or ethnic preferences at all.
Id.
5. See generally Edwin Garcia, Initiative Splits GOP Leaders Looking at Effort To Ban
Data on Race, SAN JOSE MERCusw NEWS, Feb. 22, 2003, at A1.Ward Connerly is the author
of Proposition 209, which prohibits state entities from discriminating against or giving
preferential treatment to any individual or group in public employment, public education,
or public contracting on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin. Califor-
nia Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209), CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 31 (1996).
6. California Secretary of State Official Website, Statewide Returns, at http://
vote2003.ss.ca.gov/Returns/prop/00.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2003).
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race in our society and whether the current racial classification system
and nomenclature are the best vehicles for advocating racial justice.
In an attempt to address these important issues, I argue that neither
ignoring the saliency of race, nor encompassing poor Whites in a multira-
cial coalition, will necessarily lead to progress for racial minorities.
"Essentialized" race consciousness and racial solidarity are not entirely
satisfying solutions either, because they too often lead to problems of ra-
cial authenticity. By defining what legitimately qualifies as "Blackness,"
racial authenticity often manifests itself through an over reliance on pig-
mentation as a proxy for race in ways which are sure to marginalize racial
minorities. Therefore, I conclude that we remain bereft of an adequate
theory of social resistance that can both recognize and address the episte-
mological and ontological difficulties of racial identity in general and
multiracial identity in particular. Below, I propose a workable framework
to address racial identity within the context of racial resistance.
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I briefly places the
significance of the Supreme Court's affirmative action ruling in Grutter v.
Bollinger in context 7 particularly the implications of its recommended
twenty-five year timeframe in recognizing racial diversity. Part II examines
the dangerous consequences of implicit assumptions underlying the RPI.
More specifically, I investigate the potential ramifications the RPI would
have had upon multiple sectors of our society, including healthcare,
education, and law enforcement. In the process, I attempt to demonstrate
that the concept of racial privacy is a strategic misnomer intended not to
protect one's privacy, but rather to privatize race away from the
accountability of governmental institutions. Part III discusses multiracial
identity and the hierarchy of racial classifications. I examine why multiracial
classification advocates conceptually support the RPI but nonetheless
remain skeptical of its ability to render racial distinctions meaningless.
In Part IV I attempt to illustrate through personal narrative why
multiracial identity is not necessarily inconsistent with a regime of self-
identified monoracial classification. In addition, I discuss precisely why we
should continue to repudiate colorblind initiatives such as Connerly's
RPI. Part V addresses the more general difficulties posed by racial
classifications, including objections raised by progressive colorblind
theorists. In this regard, I attempt to unpack the relationship between
racial identity and movements for racial justice, giving some attention to
the notion of political race recently articulated by Lani Guinier and
Gerald Torres. Ultimately, I hope to offer critical considerations for an
effective stratagem, and perhaps, a better fate for positive race conscious
remedies in the twenty-five years to come.
7. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
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I.TWENTY-FIVEYEARS LEFT OF RACE CONSCIOUSNESS?
In Grutter v. Bollinger' and Gratz v. Bollinger,9 the U.S. Supreme Court
found that diversity is a compelling state interest, and that race may be
narrowly used as one among many factors to determine student admission
eligibility in a non-mechanical and individualized fashion."0 The Court's
position on this newly endorsed interest did not come without strong
reservation from the individual members of the Court. In fact, six justices
made clear that the Court expects that twenty-five years from now, the
consideration of race in admissions will no longer be necessary to further
the interest of diversity. 1 Justices Ginsburg and Breyer took issue with
O'Connor's suggestion of a termination point by observing that:
If]or at least part of that time, however, the law could not fairly
be described as "settled," and in some regions of the Nation,
overtly race-conscious admissions policies have been pro-
scribed.... Moreover, it was only 25 years before Bakke that
this Court declared public school segregation unconstitutional,
a declaration that, after prolonged resistance, yielded an end to
a law-enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of centuries
of slavery.12
It is debatable whether the twenty-five year timeframe is a forecast
or, as Justice Ginsburg contends, a hope that racial considerations will not
be necessary, or neither, as Justice Thomas contends. Justice Thomas de-
finitively characterized "the imposition of a twenty-five year time limit
only as a holding that the deference the Court pays to the Law School's
educational judgments and refusal to change its admissions policies will
itself expire."1 3 Indeed one might say that the deference the Court exer-
cised in reviewing the use of race in Michigan's admissions programs will
eventually be non-existent, given the credible assumption that an exten-
sive imposition upon non-beneficiaries beyond twenty-five years will no
longer be politically tolerated. Thus, whether the Court's timeframe is a
hope or a forecast, strict scrutiny analysis may eventually become "fatal in
fact" after the passage of an additional twenty-five years of impatience by
8. Id.
9. 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).
10. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
11. Id. at 2346.
12. Id. at 2347 (internal citation omitted).
13. Id. at 2365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at
2364 n. 13 ("I agree with Justice Ginsburg that the Court's holding that racial discrimina-
tion in admissions will be illegal in 25 years is not based upon a 'forecast'.... I do not




affirmative action opponents and colorblind advocates.14 Regardless of
whether such efforts prove fruitful, one might say that the Court, in effect,
put the nation on notice that the political will of Americans will no
longer tolerate the use of race as the rumbling of dissent becomes louder.
II.THE RACIAL PRIVACY INITIATIVE
That rumbling noise of dissent has begun in California. In fact, the
day when race would begin to vanish as a consideration already occurred
with the passage of Proposition 209, the state-wide ban on affirmative
action in California's university system." But in a promising development,
California voters recently decided to vote against the passage of the RPI.
6
The RPI proposal, officially known as "Classification By Race, Ethnicity,
Color or National Origin," or "Proposition 54," was designed to prevent
California's public agencies from classifying "any individual by race, eth-
nicity, color or national origin in the operation of public education,
public contracting or public employment."'7 Further, the initiative defines
"classification" as any "act of separating, sorting or organizing by race,
ethnicity, color or national origin including, but not limited to, inquiring,
profiling, or collecting such data on government forms." 8 Attempting to
remove all consideration of race from governmental accountability is not
unusual for the conservative Connerly, who successfully passed prohibi-
tions on racial preferences in California and Washington, 9 and set his
sights on doing the same in Michigan just one day after Grutter and Gratz
were decided." Although defeated, the initiative would have significantly
curtailed the ability to hold state institutions accountable by rendering
14. Justice Brennan argued that the Court's review under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment should be "strict, but not 'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361-
62.
15. See California Civil Rights Initiative (Proposition 209), CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 31
(1996).
16. See generally Garcia, supra note 5, at Al.
17. CA.L. CONST. art. I, 5 32(a) (proposed amendment), available at http://
voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/2-3-4-text.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
18. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 32(c) (proposed amendment), available at http://
voterguide.ss.ca.gov/propositions/2-3-4-text.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
19. For more on Connerly's successes in California and Washington and his plans
for Michigan, see Joel Kurth, Voters May Decide Affirmative Action, DETROIT NEWS, July 3,
2003; see also Washington Secretary of State Official Website, Text of Initiative 200, at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/initiatives/text/i200.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2004); By All Means Necessary Official Website, Who Is Ward Connerly?, at http://
www.bamn.com/doc/2003/do.asp?0309-who-is-ward-connerly.asp (last visited Mar. 10,
2004).
20. See The Tavis Smiley Show Interview with Ward Connerly (NPR radio broadcast)
(July 9, 2003) (discussing Connerly's stated belief that the Grutter decision represents a
defeat for America and announcing his efforts to bring an initiative, similar to Proposition
209, to Michigan voters).
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potential proof in the form of statistical data unavailable to the public. It
was, in the words of Patricia Williams, a "kind of 'don't ask, don't tell'
stance of racial revelation. 21
Approximately 983,761 Californians joined the effort to eliminate
racial classification by signing a petition to place the RPI on the ballot.
22
It represented Connerly's second attempt to get the RPI on the ballot; he
previously failed to procure a vote sufficient to qualify the RPI for
placement on the March 2002 ballot. By employing the services of
signature-gathering companies that can charge up to $3.50 per signature,
Connerly was finally able to raise significant funds to gather more than
enough signatures. However, only 670,518 were required for state-wide
ballot qualification in California.
23
It should concern even conservative minded voters that if the RPI
passed, there would not exist a source of independent statistical
information available to challenge claims of racial disparity made by both
the right and the left. In fact, this is the very reason that some
conservatives have not entirely welcomed Connerly's initiative. 24 Perhaps
their concern stems from the realization that a vacuum of data may leave
moral, political, and legal claims even more susceptible to public
manipulation by pundits or advocacy groups. For example, Thomas
Wood, co-author of Proposition 209, opposed the initiative for the very
reason that one cannot enforce Proposition 209 without statistics that
would otherwise be prohibited by the RPI.2 ' Further, at least one
21. Patricia Williams, Diary of A Mad Law Professor, NATION, available at http://
www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20020617&s=williams (June 17,2002).
22. See Press Release of Kevin Nguyen, Racial Privacy Initiative Proponents
Mark Passing of November 2002 Ballot Deadline, at http://www.racialprivacy.org/
content/press/june27_2002.php (June 27, 2002).
23. See William Brand, Racial Privacy Initiative Heading for State Ballot, OAKLAND
TRIB., Apr. 17, 2002, at Al ("[T]he institute has spent well more than $1 million on the
petition drive. 'Donations have ranged from $2 to a $100,000 contribution from Joseph
W. Coors,' Connerly said.").
24. Nearly all of the major California gubernatorial candidates openly opposed the
initiative, including current Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Suzy Khimm,
Avalanche Against Prop 54, at http://www.alternet.org/story.html?StorylD =16972 (Oct.
17, 2003). Likewise, in 1999, when Connerly tried to get a similar measure passed in Flor-
ida, Governor Jeb Bush, a fellow conservative, warned that the fight over the proposed
ballot initiative would cause even greater racial divisions in his state. Instead, Bush adopted his
own state program to curb affirmative action in college admissions, and Connerly's efforts
failed. Governor Jeb Bush replaced Connerly's Florida Civil Rights Initiative with One
Florida. See DeWayne Wickham, Bush's Good (Not Pefect) Affirmative Action, at http://
www.oneflorida.org/myflorida/government/governorinitiatives/one-florida/articles/
bush-27s good not-perfect aff action.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2004).
25. See Emil Guillermo, Jayson Blair, the RPI and APA Heritage Month, at http:/
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/gate /archive/2003/05/20/eguillermo.DTL (May
20, 2003) (noting an "ecstatic" Thomas Wood over observing only a 48% Field Poll in
support of the RPI, which incidentally was the same as a year ago). According to
[VOL. 9:387
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prominent state Republican voiced concerns that the initiative would
unduly hurt the racial image of the party during a critical time of
rebuilding.2 6
The potential impact of the RPI proposal should not be underesti-
mated. According to Williams:
In such a world, there can be no easy way to know whether
Native American women are being sterilized at higher rates in
public hospitals than other groups. One would not be able to
determine whether public schools were tracking [B]lack stu-
dents into remedial classes and [W]hite students into advanced
placement. Documentation of ghettoization and other patterns
of residential segregation would be magically wiped from cen-
sus data.2 7
According to Williams, the proposal's purported colorblind approach is
anything but colorblind.28 For instance, the RPI would not allow racial
profiling data to be assembled in order to assess police misconduct.29
Guillermo, Wood indicated that "such a low figure with a year to go assured the RPI was
as good as dead." Id. But in opposition to Proposition 54,Wood unequivocally stated:
[T]he RPI would gut the enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, including
Prop. 209 itself. I pointed out to them that the state GOP had endorsed
CCRI/209, and that California Republicans had supported it overwhelm-
ingly on election day, 5 Nov 1996. It was a foregone conclusion, I said, that
the RPI would be opposed on election day by a large majority of liberals,
Democrats, and racial and ethnic minorities in the state. I explained to the
committee that this alone would be bad enough for the GOP, but that it
would be even worse if (as I confidently predicted) a majority of Republican
voters, including most [W]hite, conservative voters, also voted against the
measure, once these voters realized that it would make it virtually impossible
to enforce Prop. 209, which they had overwhelmingly supported.
Thomas E. Wood, The Ideology of the Racial Privacy Initiative, at http://www.aadap.org/
ideology.htm#_Toc37479769 (Mar. 23, 2003).
26. Shannon Reeves, acting on behalf of the California Republican Party as its
secretary, became so alarmed by the initiative and potential voter backlash that he sent an
email to the party's twenty board members prompting the party to not endorse the initia-
tive in the March 2002 ballot bid. See Michelle Alexander, The Racial Privacy Initiative:
Ward Connerlys Latest Assault on Civil Rights, at http://www.aclunc.org/opinion/
010626-assaultcivil rights.html (Apr. 1, 2001) (ACLU Op-Ed).
27. Williams, supra note 21, at 1-2.
28. Id.
29. The proposition provides that:
Neither the governor, the legislature nor any statewide agency shall require law
enforcement officers to maintain records that track individuals on the basis of
said classifications, nor shall the governor, the legislature or any statewide
agency withhold funding to law enforcement agencies on the basis of the fail-
ure to maintain such records. Subsection (h) provides that the otherwise lawful
SPRING 2004]
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Conceivably, under this exemption, "penitentiary wardens could still
segregate prisoners by race to halt race riots and police lieutenants
wouldn't have to be colorblind in assigning undercover cops to infiltrate
racially-based gangs. 3 ° It is quite curious how racial classification is
permissible in criminal repression of people of color by law enforcement
but impermissible when it legitimately questions law enforcement
conduct. As Roger Clegg, a proponent of the RPI, testified before the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights: "a good example [of racial
classification]" is when "a prison includes a physical description of an
inmate in his file; this information would obviously be useful if, say, the
prisoner escaped and the police needed to identify him. '31 It is
reprehensible that under the RPI it is innocuous to use race to advance
racial suppression and control, yet, after Proposition 209, the use of race to
allocate equal educational opportunity is prohibited.
The RPI proposal is not the first to embrace this tenuous paradox.
In fact, several courts have relied on the "operational need" of law en-
forcement and correctional agencies as a justification to uphold hiring or
assignment practices that favor minorities, even in the absence of past dis-
crimination.32 In fact, disciplinary segregation in prison has been cited as a
model example of the kind of race consciousness that the Fourteenth
assignment of prisoners and undercover law enforcement officers shall be ex-
empt from this section.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 32 (g) (proposed amendment), available at http://
www.racialprivacy.org/content/language.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2004); see also John
Woolfolk, MERCURY NEWS, Prop. 54 Effect On Police Debated, at http://
www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/ local/6789227.htm (Sep. 16, 2003).
Woolfolk notes:
Some profiling studies may be unaffected. Most notably, the California
Highway Patrol, which agreed to track the race of drivers who are stopped
to settle a profiling lawsuit by a San Jose motorist, may be allowed under an
exemption for consent decrees.The initiative also exempts programs that col-
lect racial information to comply with federal law or maintain eligibility for
federal programs, or where it would otherwise result in loss of federal fund-
ing.
Id.
30. Steve Sailer, Pondering Patterson [IV]: Why We Can't Get Beyond Race, at http://
www.vdare.com/sailer/pondering-patterson_4.htm (June 8,2001).
31. Racial and Ethnic Data Collection by Government Agencies: Statement by Roger Clegg
to the US. Commission on Civil Rights, at http://www.adversity.net/RPI/RPIpages/
3_new.htm (May 17,2002). Roger Clegg has also unsuccessfully sought to end affirmative
action admissions programs. See Nathan Collins, Suit Weighs in on Admissions Policy, at
http://ww-w-tech.mit.edu/Vl23/Nfour/4mites-gruder.fourn.html. (last visited Mar. 16,
2003).
32. See, e.g., Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F3d 524, 530-31 (7th Cir. 2002);
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F3d 916,921 (7th Cir. 1996); Talbert v. City of Richmond, 648 F2d
925, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1981); Minnick v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 157 Cal. Rptr. 260, 268-69
(1st App. Dist. 1979).
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Amendment allows. 33 For example, in Wittmer v. Peters,34 ChiefJudge Posner
upheld the use of preferential treatment to hire a Black correctional officer
at an Illinois boot camp for young offenders in order to promote discipline
and order.3" Even more significant is that Supreme Court jurisprudence has
not foreclosed or prohibited Posner's approach. Indeed, a majority of the
Court has validated that order, control, and security constitute a "pressing
public necessity," or to use modern parlance, a "compelling state interest,"
which can justify racial discrimination by state actors.36 Even as recently as
the Grutter decision,Justice Thomas affirmed that: "[w]here the Court has
accepted only national security, and rejected even the best interests of a
child, as a justification for racial discrimination, I conclude that only those
measures the State must take to provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to
prevent violence, will constitute a 'pressing public necessity.' 37
Another exception to the initiative's prohibition, which permitted
racial and ethnic classification of medical research subjects and patients,
also appeared to have an especially harsh result for people of color. Data
on race and ethnicity extracted from public health and other records, such
as population-based surveys that are the cornerstone of our current
knowledge, would be outlawed. Collecting racial data concerning the
impact of Black infant mortality, breast cancer, heart disease, osteoporosis,
AIDS, tuberculosis, prostate cancer, sickle cell anemia, lead poisoning, and
teen smoking would all be impermissible under the initiative. What is
troubling is that much of the aforementioned demographic data is not
obtained through "medical research" of any kind. Consequently, this
exemption, which would have possibly expired after ten years in
accordance with the RPI, makes little sense except perhaps as a clever
public relations guise of objectivity that utterly fails to recognize the
reality of how our public health administrations operate.3" Perhaps the
33. See, e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972) (per curiam); Lee v.Washington,
390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam); Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 E Supp. 1185, 1189 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
34. 87 E 3d. 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
35. Id. at 920-21.
36. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("Pressing public neces-
sity may sometimes justify the existence of racial discrimination; racial antagonism never
can.").
37. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2352 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding that
even the best interests of a child do not constitute a compelling state interest that would
allow a state court to award custody to a father because the mother was in a mixed-race
marriage). In Palmore, the Court found that the governmental interest in granting custody
based on the best interests of the child "substantial," but ultimately held that the custody
decision could not be based on the race of the mother's new husband. Id. at 433; cf Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (per curiam) (Black,J., concurring) (indicating that
protecting prisoners from violence might justify narrowly tailored racial discrimination).
38. See Williams, supra note 21.
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case against the RPI is best stated by the Santa Clara Public Health
Department, a state agency directly impacted by it:
[F]rom a Public Health surveillance perspective, we do not
support the [RPI].We know that in this day and age racial and
ethnic disparity still exist [sic] in our country. Inequalities exist
not only in health but also in education, professional, and fi-
nancial opportunities .... Being colorblind will not eliminate
the racism and prejudice that exists within our society. In our
work, race information is an essential tool. If we produced re-
ports for the overall county population without race
information, we would never be able to identify the health
disparities that exist within various race/ethnicities. With this
type of critical information we can help to eliminate the ine-
qualities that exist and make the most effective use of limited
resources. Many diseases and conditions have both biological
and behavioral risk factors. For our purposes, race serves as a
proxy for culture. Cultural beliefs and practices profoundly im-
pact the personal choices that a person makes about his/her
health. As health protectors and promoters, race as well as cul-
ture and language are critical pieces of information that
improve the quality of services provided to clients.3"
Although an exemption is made for federal compliance require-
ments mandating the collection of race data, an approach such as the RPI,
if taken to its extreme, may one day cripple monitoring efforts. For ex-
ample, it would be extremely difficult to monitor access of minorities to
home mortgage loans under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act;4  to
enforce the Equal Credit Opportunity Act41 and the Fair Housing Act;42
to monitor and enforce desegregation plans in public schools; or to assist
minority businesses under minority business development programs. In
the area of child welfare, the elimination of race data would undermine
enforcement of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 3 which actually requires
placement of Indian children with foster or adoptive families of similar
ethnic backgrounds. 4 While these federal acts would presumably preempt
the initiative to the extent that they are inconsistent, it remains a distinct
possibility that "the state interpretation and practice is broader in scope
39. Meeting of the Board Of Supervisors, Santa Clara County, Agenda Item A: Oppose
Racial Privacy Initiative, at http://www.sccgov.org/scc/assets/docs/224376Keyboard
Attachment-200457695.pdf. (Mar.11, 2003) [hereinafter Agenda Item A].
40. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-2810 (2003).
41. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C.A. % 1691(a)-(o (2003).
42. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 5§ 3604-3619 (2003).




and would have been negatively proscribed by the RPI as to hamper data
collection and effective enforcement. 4s Likewise, mandates in the No
Child Left Behind Act46 to employ racial classifications for purposes of
testing and accountability, while still feasible under preemption, may have
been hampered by a broader interpretation that would have precluded
data collection necessary for effective assessment, development, mentor-
ing, and other remedial measures necessary to achieve adequate yearly
educational progress.4 7 These anti-discrimination laws are crucial to reme-
dying discriminatory effects not easily corrected by, for example, intrinsic
market forces as some have suggested.
48
Technically however, under the RPI as proposed, race could have
been used in some circumstances beyond the exemptions described above.
Although the probability of this remained highly unlikely, because a two-
thirds majority of both houses of the state legislature would have been
required.49 Notwithstanding the defeat of the RPI, the current systematic
assault on legal regimes which are designed to achieve racial equity" may
bring us closer to the day when race will be judicially declared irrelevant.
The term racial privacy is a conceptual misnomer that has very little
to do with protecting the privacy of one's racial identity as Connerly
45. Agenda Item A, supra note 39, at 3. This could have been achieved by the RPI
unless the legislature and governor were to act otherwise.
46. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 1111 (b)(2)(H)(i)-
(iii), 115 Stat. 1425,1444-48 (2002).
47. See id.
48. See generally RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EM-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (arguing that regulation is unnecessary given the
market nature of the workforce); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-15
(1962) (advocating a free market approach for remedying discrimination).
49. The probability is unlikely because Section 32(b) of the initiative provides:
The state shall not classify any individual by race, ethnicity, color or national
origin in the operation of any other state operations, unless the legislature
specifically determines that said classification serves a compelling state inter-
est and approves said classification by a 2/3 majority in both houses of the
legislature, and said classification is subsequently approved by the governor.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 32(b) (proposed amendment), available at http://voterguide.ss.ca.gov/
propositions/2-3-4-text.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2003).
50. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001). Indeed, whatever little
remains of civil rights enforcement after the crippling decision in Alexander v. Sandoval that
barred private suits under Title VI alleging a racially disparate impact, would have been
nearly obliterated by the proposed RPI ban on statistical data gathering, a critical tool to
show disparity. Of course, similar to the proposed RPI, the implications of the decision are
far reaching for civil rights groups since the rights and remedies under the implementing
regulations of Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as Title IX of the Higher Education
Amendments of 1972, are the same as those prohibited from private enforcement under
Title VI. See ADA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (2004); Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 45
C.FR. § 84 (2003); Higher Education Amendments of 1972,34 C.ER. § 106 (2003).
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asserts, and more to do with the privatization of race away from
governmental accountability in healthcare, education, and law
enforcement. Nonetheless, the initiative's rhetoric is postured to appeal to
the popular notion of preserving privacy in much the same fashion as one
preserves medical history, credit information, or religious affiliation from
prying eyes. It is also conceived as a measure designed to curb state power.
The RPI proposal "carves out a sphere of autonomy within which the
state may not intrude. Thus, beyond individuals not being obligated to
check boxes indicating race, the state can no longer check the boxes for
them.'"" However, this rationale is not only unpersuasive, but logically
inconsistent as it elides the fact that race is a social construct from which
we base our interpersonal interactions and often implicitly ascribe world
views and social status. Thus, that which the world knows is not suddenly
made private simply because it is no longer checked off in a box. So long
as material inequality and personal attributes are commonly attributed to
one's racial identity, it will not cease to exist in the minds and hearts of
the American populace. The fact that no governmental classification is
available does not inflect this longstanding reality. Accordingly, Connerly's
RPI appears to be predicated upon the unsupported proposition that
categorical distinctions based upon race did not come into existence well
before the government's classification. 2 Race, while not a bona-fide
scientific category as some have despairingly attempted to prove, 3 is very
real nonetheless in our society.s4 Because of this reality, government will
51. R. Richard Banks, Introduction to Border People and Antidiscrimination Law, 17
HAv. BLACKLETTER L.J. 25 (2001).
52. Long before the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued the Race
and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting in 1978, racial
distinctions could be witnessed--even as early as the European slave trade which began in
1444. See LERONE BENNETT JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA 29
(1969) (noting that "[a] year before the arrival of the celebrated Mayflower, 113 years
before the birth of George Washington, 244 years before the signing of the Emancipation
Proclamation, a ship sailed" to Jamestown,Virginia carrying a cargo of African slaves).
53. See RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MUIRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994) (arguing that there are differences
between races in measured intelligence and positing that such differences are genetic in
origin). See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981) (recounting
scientific studies that measured skulls to prove Africans are intellectually inferior).
54. See Chris K. Iijima, The Era of We-Construction: Reclaiming the Politics of Asian
Pacific American Identity and Reflections on the Critique of the Black/White Paradigm, 29 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47, 53 (1997) ("Although race is socially constructed and not an im-
mutable biological characteristic, the effect of the phenomenon of race is nonetheless
real."); Charles R. Lawrence I1, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation,
47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 835 n,71 (1995) ("To recognize that race is socially constructed does
not make it any less real."); John A. Powell, The Colorblind Multiracial Dilemma: Racial Catego-
ries Reconsidered, 31 U.S.F L. REv. 789, 791 (1997) ("While the claim that race is an illusion
draws on the work of late- and post-modernists ... which purports that race is socially con-




never be wholly blind to race in all respects nor is it the case, as others
have suggested, that America will cease to think about race once there is
no required self-reporting of racial classification."5 Therefore, when
deconstructed down to its most basic terms, racial privacy appears to be
nothing more than perhaps a strategic label which resonates with sectors
of the electorate that find appeal in its superficial promise of a multiracial,
yet colorblind, society.
III. MULTIRACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND RACIAL HIERARCHY
The Black community is the mother of this multiracial com-
munity, she (Black community) has carried this "child" and is
now giving birth. The birth pains are GREAT! The White
community is the father. He's responsible for siring this child
but he's not interested. Finally, the child is born. Now the child
wants it's own space and a different name from it's mother. She
doesn't want to let go .... There's some distance between the
father and child and even some reluctance to recognize that
there's even a relationship. The mother's feeling are hurt be-
cause she doesn't understand why this child wants to be
different from her after she's nurtured and given recognition to
her child. Her hurt feelings give way to resentment as her child
leaves her to find his niche in the world. 6
As the foregoing quote may suggest, the movement in support of the RPI
appeals to some multiracial advocates who have worked relentlessly to
carve their own niche in the world essentially by challenging the current
monoracial paradigm and with some success. 7 Indeed, Connerly himself
55. See Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-Consciousness Matrix and the
Multiracial Category Movement:A Critical Reply to Professor Hern/ndez, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD
UJ. 231,238 (2000). According to Robinson:
With this MCM [Multiracial Category Movement], we can weaken our nar-
row fixation on a singular racial identity, and by broadening our racial lenses,
we can achieve at least five goals. First, we can shift our race consciousness.
Second, we can destabilize racial categories completely. Third, we can think,
talk, and use "race" categories toward a higher, Spiritual end. Fourth, we can
eradicate all racial categories. Fifth, we can begin to relate to each other as
Spirit beings, despite the different "color" garb we may choose in a given
lifetime.
Id.
56. Tracy Cope, Developing A Multiracial Perspective, at http://www.webcom.com/
intvoice/pointl 2.htnsl (Feb. 5, 1997).
57. In addition to successfully lobbying for changes in the 2000 census calling for a
multiracial category, the Multiracial Category Movement has also been successful with
data-collection forms in Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Florida. See GA.
CODE. ANN. § 50-18-135 (1994) (requiring a multiracial category on state forms used for
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is multiracial, having 25% Black lineage, with the rest of his ancestors
White or American Indian. Further, organizations such as the Association
of MultiEthnic Americans have expressed support for the Connerly initia-
tive even though they view it as unlikely to lead to the elimination of
racial classifications in the immediate future. 8 Connerly's contempt for
the government's current racial categorization in an increasingly diverse
nation is undoubtedly a major part of why multiracial persons support his
initiative.- 9
Indeed, it is sure to be frustrating to many in the Multiracial Cate-
gory Movement (MCM) that the prevailing census race classification
paradigm, long before recent changes to the 2000 census, has been
monoracial. ° Both Connerly and sectors within the multiracial camps
justify their position by the fact that the current monoracial conception,
or the Black/White paradigm," is far more simplistic than the true reality
reporting racial data to federal agencies); 105 ILL. COMP. STA. ANN. 5/2-3.111 (West 1998)
(mandating multiracial category on all forms used by the State Board of Education to
collect and report on data that contain racial categories); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-15-5.1-6.5
(Michie Supp. 1997) (mandating multiracial category in certain forms used by public
agencies); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2202a (West 2001) (mandating public agency
forms and questionnaires to include a multiracial category); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3313.941 (Anderson 1997) (requiring a multiracial category on school district forms
that collect racial data); see also Doug Stanley, Census Bureau to Test Revised Race Categories,
TAMPA TRIB.,June 4, 1996, at 1, available at 1996 WL 10230771 (noting a multiracial cate-
gory was added to Florida's school enrollment forms and computers).
58. See generally Ramona Douglass, Ramona's Census Subcommittee Testimony,
at http://www.h-net.msu.edu/gateways/migration/threads/political/OMB15AMEA.html/
(May/June 1994) (testimony on a "multiracial" OMB category). Ramona Douglass is an
officer in the Association of MultiEthnic Americans.
59. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Payson, Check One Box: Reconsidering No. 15 and the Classifi-
cation of Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1233, 1236-37 (1996) (noting the monoracial
categorical approach is ill-advised in light of the "increasing mixed-race population" of
America).
60. Monoracial and ethnic classifications were instituted in 1978 by the United
States Office of Management and Budget in cooperation with the Minority Advisory
Committees of the U.S. Census Bureau for standardized collection of racial data by the
U.S. Bureau of Census and all other government agencies. The instituted classification
system intended to meet the obligations for data in federal civil rights laws. The OMB
classification system also includes a separate Hispanic-Origin ethnicity question to reflect
the fact that Latinos and Latinas can be of White racial ancestry, Black racial ancestry, or
Native American ancestry. Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Adminis-
trative Reporting, 43 FED. REG. 19,260, 19,269 (May 4, 1978); see also Bijan Gilanshah,
Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAw & NEQ.J. 183, 184 (1993) (noting that
the Multiracial Category Movement has focused on the census racial classifications to
establish "official recognition [of mixed-race Americans] as a distinct, powerful social
unit.").
61. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race
Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. Ray. 1243, 1267 (1993) ("To focus
on the [B]lack-[W]hite racial paradigm is to misunderstand the complicated racial
situation in the United States."); see also ANNE SUTHERLAND, GypsiEs: TtIE HIDDEN
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of a "technicolor nation." In fact, racial intermingling, through the birth
of interracial children, interracial dating, sex, and marriage, is on the rise.
6 2
Population geneticist Mark Shriver found that the average self-identified
African American is 171/-18% White in contrast to the average American
White who is 0.7% Black.6 3 In addition, approximately 10% of adults who
call themselves Black are more than 50% White.64 The "browning" and
"beiging" of America has thus solidly taken root.
Some multiracial persons, however, may take issue with colorblind
activists such as Connerly and their insistence on eliminating racial cate-
gories rather than defining more accurate ones that acknowledge their
special existence. As Ramona Douglass of the Association of MultiEthnic
Americans testified before the House Subcommittee on the census:
What we don't have, which is no longer acceptable to the
ever growing millions we represent, is an official
acknowledgment of our very existence. I can't be "[W]hite" in
the state of Illinois because it deems the race of the mother as
the only reliable criteria for determining the "race" of the child,
and at the same time be "[B]lack" or Native American in
another state which only acknowledges the race of the father, or
minority-designated parent. It's not logical, it's not real and,
more importantly, it's not me. The term "other" is also
AMERICANS (1986); Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375
(1999);Juan F Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.YU. L. REv. 965
(1995); See generally Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM.
U. L. REV. 695, 696 (1996); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo' Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture,
Latino-Critical Scholarship, and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181 (1997);Angela
Harris, Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 CAL. L. R.Ev. 741, 775 n.169 (1994);
Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47
STAsN. L. REV. 957, 957-59 (1995); William R. Tamayo, When the "Coloreds" Are Neither
Black nor Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASIAN L.J.
1 (1995); Frank Wu, Neither Black nor White:Asian Americans and Affirmative Action, 15 B.C.
THiRDWORLD L.J. 225,248 (1995).
62. Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing With Loving?: Race, Law and Intermarriage,
77 B.U.L. REv. 815,818 (1997). Kennedy notes that:
[A]ccording to the calculations of Douglas Besharov and Timothy Sullivan,
in 1960, about 1.7% of married [B]lacks had a [White spouse. In 1990, the
percentage had risen to about 5.9%. Moreover, the pace of increase in mar-
riage across the [B]lack-[W]hite racial frontier is quickening, especially in
terms of [W]hite men and [B]lack women.
Id.
63. See Steve Sailer, Racial Privacy Initiative:A Trump Card at http://www.vdare.com/
sailer/rpi.htm (June 20, 2002) (discussing Shriver's studies).
64. Id.
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unacceptable, for it negates our claims to any part of the racial
or ethnic categories listed before it.6"
For far too long multiracial classification has been plagued with in-
accuracy. This inaccuracy dates at least as far back as the seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries in the upper South. In an effort to discourage
interracial mating and with the increasing need to link free mulattoes
with enslaved mulattoes and Blacks, laws were designed to preserve
"White privilege, 66 and thus the one-drop rule was born.67 The lower
south, however, opted to treat mulattoes as a distinct third racial class,
above Blacks.6 8 Perhaps in an attempt to address this historical inaccuracy,
the 2000 Census now permits the identifcation of one or more races as an
indication of racial identity.69 For example, the three categories for the
American Indian and Alaska Native populations (American Indian,
Eskimo, or Aleut) were previously combined into one category where
one would indicate their enrolled principal tribe as an American Indian
or Alaska Native."0 Likewise, six Asian categories and three Pacific Islander
categories now appear on the Census 2000 questionnaires, in addition to
"Other Asian" and "Other Pacific Islander" categories which have write-
in sections.7" The category known as "Some Other Race" which is
intended to capture responses such as Mulatto, Creole, and Mestizo, also
contains a write-in section.
65. Douglass, supra note 58, at 2.
66. For a discussion on White privilege, see Martha R. Mahoney, Residential
Segregation and White Privilege, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR
273-75 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997); Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege
and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences through Work in
Women's Studies, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 291-99
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997); Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D.
Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE
MIRROR 314-18 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997); see also DISPLACING
WHITENESS: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CRITICISM (Ruth Frankenberg ed., 1997);
DAVID ROEDIGER, WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN
WORKING CLASS (rev. ed. 1999); STEPHANIE WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (1996); Davis, supra note 44, at 710 ("This shifting
construction of both [Bilackness and [W]hiteness illuminates both the fluidity of racial
classifying practices, and the inexorable nature of securing the [W]hite rights."); Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 H~Av. L. REV. 1707, 1777-81 (1993).
67. Payson, supra note 59, at 1244-45.
68. Id. at 1246-47.
69. See U.S. Census Bureau, Racial and Ethnic Classification Used in Census 2000 and
Beyond, at http://www.census.gov/population/ www/socdemo/race/racefactcb.html (last
modified Apr. 12, 2000) (stating that the 2000 census contains fifteen check box optional
categories and three write-in sections whereas the 1990 census contained sixteen check
box response categories and two write-in areas).
70. Id.
71. Id. (discussing other write-in categories on the 2000 census).
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However, the history of the one-drop rule in America has created
doubts about the political consequences of these new multiracial catego-
ries. One fear is that the new census approach may yield lowered numbers
in the Black and Native American categories that in turn will have harm-
ful results for racial minorities overall. Tanya Hernindez, for example,
raises concerns about the way the MCM may harm the enforcement of
federal civil rights law because Whites may manipulate these categories
and become persuaded to do further violence to egalitarian principles of
racial justice that protect racial minorities.72 This may explain why civil
rights organizations have also risen in opposition to the MCM. 3 The
concrete advantage Hernindez sees in preserving race-conscious classifi-
cation is its constant reminder to society not to abandon progress toward
racial equality."4 Naturally, she also remains weary of people who self iden-
tify as multiracial given the likelihood they will be favored as Caucasian in
our society and courts." This approach, she believes, promotes pigmen-
tocracy,76 and ignores "the political meaning of race."77 Others have also
similarly suggested that this favored mixed status, in turn, may create a
new racial hierarchy rather than dismantling the current one.7 ' For in-
stance, Rachel Moran observes that groups are differently situated with
respect to the possible ramifications of mixed-race categorization, in part
due to the dramatically different rates and consequences of intermar-
riage.7 9 Moran asserts that Asian-American intermarriage sustains racial
assimilation as Asian Americans tend to intermarry more frequently with
Whites."0 What results then is an altered elevated standing in the racial
72. See Tanya Kateri Hernindez, "Multiracial" Discourse: Racial Classifications in an Era
of Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 57 MD. L. REv. 97 (1998).
73. See Carl M. Cannon, Census Faces Racial Issue, BALT. SuN, June 29, 1997, at 1A
(noting that civil rights organizations are "worried that new ways of counting race will
dilute the political strength of minorities-and contribute to the erosions of recent eco-
nomic gains made by [BIlacks and Latinos").
74. Hernindez, supra note 72.
75. Id. at 111.
76. Pigmentocracy refers to the tendency of those with White or light skin to be
considered towards the top of the social strata, while those with darker skin are relegated
to the bottom. See Peter M. Sanchez, Ethnicity, Race and Democratic Consolidation:
The Dominican Republic, Guatamela and Peru, at http://136.142.158.105/LASA97/
sanchez.pdf (Apr. 17, 1997) (draft paper) (citing Alejandro Lipschutz, El indoamericanismo y
el problema racial en las americas (2d ed., 1944)).
77. Hernfindez, supra note 72, at 113.
78. See Banks, supra note 51, at 26 (noting that Rachel Moran suspects that the
census's mixed-race option, while contributing to the assimilation of Asian Americans, may
for [B]lacks "create yet another opportunity ... to further stratify themselves internally
based on degree of [WIhite ancestry."). Race consciousness is therefore increasingly seen as
threatened by the Multiracial Category Movement.
79. Rachel F Moran, The Mixed Promise of Multiracialism, 17 H~Aiv. BLACKLErTER L.J.
47, 50-55 (2001).
80. Id. at 51.
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hierarchy.8 ' Interracial marriage removes the otherwise prevalent pre-
sumption of disloyalty to the United States by challenging the image of
foreignness entrapped in their image within the broader American popu-
lace. 82 The same "de-ethnicization" by interracial marriage, as she puts it,
is not true for Blacks since their racial identity is not removed in the same
way it is removed for Asian Americans. z Moreover, Blacks are less inclined
to intermarry.84 In addition, racial tracking of Latinas/os is already full
with complexity due to the fact that multiple races are included in the
Latino community.
8
The fact that a significant proportion of Hispanics, Blacks, Native
Americans, and others who may also have multiracial ancestry are more
likely to self-identify, and be identified by others, monracially compounds
this concern. As such, they may not present the same data collection
problems as mixed-race persons. Some have speculated that the long-
standing phenomenon of multiracial persons "passing" for another race
might also contribute to the monoracial approach. 6 Another likely factor
that will tend to stabilize the monoracial nature of identity is the possibil-
ity that census data may be interpreted in such a way that reincarnates the
81. Id.
82. See Banks, supra note 51, at 25-26 (discussing Moran's The Mixed Promise of
Multiracialism). Rachel Moran also extensively discusses the MCM thesis, supra note 79, at
167.
83. Banks, supra note 51, at 25-26.
84. Id. Banks notes:
Even as it softens racial boundaries, it may undermine group identity and
cohesion. The census's recognition of multiple origins acknowledges both
the assimilation that intermarriage produces for Asian Americans and the dis-
tinct ethnic identity that they may wish to maintain .... African Americans
are substantially less likely than other groups to intermarry, a phenomenon
explained by a number of factors. Residential and educational segregation
leaves [B]lacks with less opportunity to intermarry. Blacks may be less in-
clined toward intermarriage, perhaps in part because, as Moran hypothesizes,
cross racial intimacy harkens back to the forced sexual liaisons of the slavery
era. Finally, [Bilacks confront resistance to intermarriage. According to
Moran, "Americans are more likely to oppose intermarriage between
[B]lacks and [W]hites than other forms of intermarriage.
Id.
85. See, e.g., Payson, supra note 59, at 1241 (noting that many Latinos self-identify as
of mixed indigenous and European heritage and that the failure of Directive No. 15 to
account for Mestizo identity requires the abandonment of its obsolete racial categories);
see also Luis Angel Toro, "A People Distinct from Others": Race and Identity in Federal Indian
Law and the Hispanic Classification in OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 1219,
1248 (1995).
86. See generally F JAMES DAVIS, WHO is BLACK? ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 125




one-drop rule. " Indeed, census officials have already indicated that self-
identified Whites who are also members of a racial minority group will be
"assigned" to the minority group.88 On the other hand, some commenta-
tors welcome the MCM advocacy as a positive means to break down
racial hierarchies and blur racial distinctions.89 For example, Professor Alex
Johnson argues in favor of multiracial classification because he essentially
believes it will engender a form of "shade confusion" that will conse-
quently render race meaningless as the Black/White paradigm fades from
existence.9" But while this approach may give Tanya Hernindez and oth-
ers in the anti-MCM camp pause, it does raise the legitimate question of
whether multiracial identity can ever be consistent with the monoracial
paradigm of self-classification that she sees as so instrumental to promot-
ing racial justice. In the search for an answer to this question, we must first
address a threshold inquiry: How is racial identity formed?
IV RACIAL IDENTITY FORMATION AND
THE MIXED-RACED PARADIGM
This part offers a claim of the process in which racial identity forma-
tion occurs and explores whether this process is compatible with
monoracial paradigms of classification. In the process, I hope to illustrate
through personal narrative precisely why, despite an increasingly multiracial
nation, we should continue to repudiate colorblind initiatives such as
Connerly's RPI and promote racial justice.
Born to a Black father and a White mother, I distinctly came to
learn that I would occupy multiple spaces-one White, one Black. Yet in
NewYork City, I cannot convince many that I am not Puerto Rican and in
New Orleans, I am suddenly mistaken as a Creole. Mine is a diverse lineage
with African American and Blackfoot Indian on one side and Sicilian,
Neapolitan, and Irish on the other. With the exception of my brother, all of
my siblings are fair-skinned. William was the only one of my brothers who
was dark-skinned, the same as my father. In fact, William happened to be
the only dark-skinned child among my two other olive-skinned siblings. I
never had the joy to know William, who died as an infant in the arms of a
nurse in a hospital somewhere in Utah.
It happened when my mother was ensconced to the emergency care
wing of the hospital after she and my father crashed their car into a ditch.
Upon admittance, my worried father learned that he could not accom-
pany her, could not visit her, could not even see her through a window.
87. Banks, supra note 51, at 26.
88. Id.
89. See Robinson, supra note 55.
90. Alex M. Johnson Jr., Destabilizing Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned
from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 887, 891 (1996).
SPRING 2004]
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
In the agony of physical trauma and the possible loss of his wife and son,
he was forced to a wing of the hospital which he was informed was re-
served for Blacks. My father was jeered and threatened. He was told that
the KKK would see to it that he would never leave town if he did not
take the opportunity to leave while he still could. Forced to decide to
abandon his wife in her time of need or risk his own possible lynching,
he bravely chose to remain. My brother, who was injured in the crash, was
attended to by a nurse who, in the words of my mother, was "so visibly
disgusted that she had to hold this Black child in her arms'" The nurse
grew so flustered and impatient with the negro infant that she rapidly
forced the milk from the bottle as she fed him. In fact, she squirted the
milk down his throat until the bottle was nearly empty. The autopsy re-
vealed that little William was drowned to death, his lungs filled with milk.
My brother died not from the injury that he sustained from the crash, but
from bigotry. My mother mourned her loss in the all-White wing and for
the first time ever, my father was seen crying in the all-Black waiting
room.
That was my first lesson in racialized space-my mother weeping in
one place, my father in another. To the external world, they appeared
worlds apart. But in the home where my parents were together, I would
later wonder whether that space was Black? Or White? Or was it devoid
of color? Life was blurry around the edges, only I did not know it in the
bliss of childhood ignorance and the happy medium my parents main-
tained from the outside. It was true, or so it seemed that "when people
intermarry and produce children of mixed race, racial identifications, ra-
cial loyalties, and racial kinships blur."' Which was I? Langston Hughes's
poem Cross makes clear both the separate racialized space of mother and
father, as well as the lingering limbo of the bewildered mixed offspring.
Was I like the narrator in that poem penned by Langston Hughes? He
wrote:
My old man died in afine big house.
My ma died in a shack.
I wonder where I'm gonna die,
Being neither [W]hite nor Black?"
Was that the case? That I was neither White nor Black? "Inter"-racial,
caught "between" races? Or bi-racial, having "both" Black and White in
me? And furthermore, would I be defined by my experience of racial hos-
tility or by pride for my heritage? Clearly it was both; but often I have
occasion to wonder if I were present in the hospital when my infant
brother died, where would I have waited? In the all-White wing with my
91. Kennedy, supra note 62, at 819.
92. Langston Hughes, Cross, in SELECTED PoEMs OF LANGSTON HUGHES 158 (1926).
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mom, or in the colored waiting room with my dad? Undoubtedly, it
would have been the latter.
Today I check only the Black/African American box out of pride,
pride from the image I have of my father and of my own history-the
magnificent pyramids of what was once known as Kemet and the ances-
tors who sacrificed in the name of freedom. I remain as I did in my
college and law school years, an advocate for Black empowerment and
social justice. I was not like the few mixed-race persons I knew that vig-
orously asserted their dual racial identity at every opportunity. Although
the pain of having to choose between races is a phenomenon well docu-
mented in the lives of biracial children and adults, 93 for me, the initial
difficulty as a child was instead feeling very much in limbo. The Black
side of my family shunned my siblings and me because of our White
mother. Likewise, our White Italian family disowned us the moment pa-
rental affiliation began. Consequently, as a child and a teenager, I never
knew extended family of any kind that would help solidify and ground
my cultural and racial identity beyond my immediate one. I soon came to
understand that race is not hereditary or an inheritance that is passed
down. 94 How could it be? Both of my brothers identify themselves quite
differently, with one asserting his White identity and the other claiming
both aspects of his racial identity, even though they grew up in the same
household as I. In contrast to an essentialist outlook, which "assumes that
the experience of being a member of the group ... is a stable one, one
with a clear meaning, a meaning constant through time, space, and differ-
ent historical, social, political, and personal contexts,"95 my context was
fluid and evolving. As the historian Barbara Fields once wrote, "if race
lives on today, it does not live on because we have inherited it from our
forbears of the seventeenth century or eighteenth or nineteenth, but be-
cause we continue to create it today."
96
Physically looking neither White nor Black, I did appear for a long
time to be somewhere ambiguously in between."7 I soon learned that
93. See generally Philip M. Brown, Biracial Identity and Social Marginality, 7 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 319 (1990); James H. Jacobs, Identity Development in Biracial
Children, in RACIALLY MIXED PEOPLE IN AMERICA 190, 190-206 (Maria PP. Root ed.,
1992); Deborah J. Johnson, Racial Preference and Biculturality in Biracial Preschoolers, 38
MERRILL-PALMER Q. 233 (1992); Kathy Overmier, Biracial Adolescents: Areas of Conflict in
Identity Formation, 14J.APPLIED Soc. ScI. 157 (1990).
94. See generally Ian F Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observation
on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HAv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1994).
95. Trina GriUo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master's
House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 16, 19 (1995).
96. Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States ofAmerica, 181
NEw LEFT REV. 95, 117 (1990).
97. See generally HALF AND HALF: WRITERS ON GROWING Up BIRACIAL AND BICUL-
TumAL (Claudine Chiawei O'Hearn ed., 1998); WHAT AREYOU?:VOICES OF MIXED-RACE
YOUNG PEOPLE (Pearl Fuyo Gaskins ed., 1999).
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phenotype goes a long way in facilitating racial identity because it is the
foundation for the social interaction with others by which one largely
comes to identify one's self 9' In this sense, racial identity formation can
largely be derived from predominately phenotypic community character-
istics. According to Ian Haney L6pez:
[C]ommunities can serve as mediums linking race to identity
and back again only if communities are somehow racially
identifiable. The morphological similarities of people who have
long lived in geographic or social proximity seem to offer an
easy explanation for the overlap of communities and races: that
communities came first and were racialized as a function of the
race-obsessed social ideology of this country.9
L6pez also observes:
[R]ace must be understood as a sui generis social phenomenon in
which contested systems of meaning serve as the connections
between physical features, races, and personal characteristics. In
other words, social meanings connect our faces to our souls.
Race is neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongo-
ing, contradictory, self-reinforcing process subject to the macro
forces of social and political struggle and the micro effects of
daily decisions.'
If the significance ascribed to phenotype and racial sorting used to de-
mark people are not biologically inherent, but rather socially constructed,
98. Phenotype describes an individual's observable physical attributes, such as height,
eye, hair, and skin color, facial features, and hair texture. As defined by a medical dictionary,
phenotype is "the entire physical, biochemical, and physiological makeup of an individual
as determined both genetically and environmentally, as opposed to genotype." DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1277 (28th ed. 1994).
99. L6pez, supra note 94, at 54. According to L6pez:
Under this view, for example, the myriad disparate Native American cultures
were collapsed into a single monotonous racial "Indian" by the Anglo em-
phasis on morphological difference as a trope for social and power
inequalities. In this way, Native American peoples, like the Mexicans of the
Southwest and the Chinese in California described earlier, presumably ex-
isted as communities before elements of their morphology became racially
meaningful; they were members of communities before they were members
of a race.
Id. at 54-55.
100. Id. at 7; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM.
L. Rav. 1060, 1067 (1991) ("While not every decision we make necessarily has a racial




how was it that I came to psychologically, spiritually, and emotionally
evolve into my current state of Black race consciousness? 1 '
In so evolving I did not, however, reject my White Italian heritage
or that of my Native-American ancestors. They are sophistically inter-
woven in multiple layers that, for the most part, only reinforce my
experience as a racial minority. But in claiming my Black identity in the
company of inquiring Whites and other Blacks, I rejected the vast number
of multiracial persons who time and time again would identify with the
non-minority part of themselves. Indeed, this occurred far more than one
could reasonably attribute to mere coincidence. A former chairman of
the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has speculated that "a whole host of
[B]lacks [will run] for the door the minute they have another choice [as
a] way of saying, 'I am something other than [B]lack.'-102 Isn't that similar
to what happened to the Black flight which occurred the moment Jim
Crow was declared illegal? But when I would acknowledge my Black
identity, Whites were made uncomfortable while many Blacks were pen-
chant, even combative, but more often so sure of what they saw that they
did not even begin to question whether I was anything other than Latino.
Some thought they figured me out, others were uncomfortably unsure.
Others suspected I was a mixture of "some kind" just gleaning from the
fact that my surname does not sound Hispanic. In fact, a former law firm
colleague of mine remained silently curious until the proper moment in
conversation came when he could eagerly ask about my racial and ethnic
mix without seeming as if he were prying. "Why do you want to know?"
I inquired, as if I could momentarily guard my racial privacy from the fact
that I was undeniably a person of color. "So I know what jokes I can
make without offending you," he replied. Naturally, the realization that he
could not tell Black, Irish, Native American, or Italian jokes left him even
more perplexed. At each encounter I am often reminded of sociologists
Michael Omi and Howard Winant who observe that:
[O]ne of the first things we notice about people when we
meet them (along with their sex) is their race. We utilize race
to provide clues about who a person is. The fact is made
painfully obvious when we encounter someone whom we
cannot conveniently racially categorize-someone who is, for
example, racially "mixed" or of an ethnic/racial group with
which we are not familiar. Such. an encounter becomes a
101. See, e.g., L6pez, supra note 94, at 7 (noting that race is located within the cartog-
raphy of other social constructions).
102. Banks, supra note 51, at 27 (quoting Rachel Moran, former chairman of the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights).
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source of discomfort and momentarily a crisis of racial
meaning.'03
My racial orientation was undoubtedly shaped not only by my
eventual racial acceptance within my group of Black peers, but also
through pride in my heritage, the latter of which could gradually with-
stand any given rise or fall in my racial acceptance within my group of
Black peers. Of course, my orientation was also a result of the experiences
of alienation, which among other things included being misdiagnosed
with a learning disability and tracked into academic dead-end courses
with a majority of fellow students of color, being subjected to police traf-
fic pullovers, and being subjected to hostility when engaging in activism
for common equality. Unaware of these experiences, some Blacks I met
would often quietly, or very truculently, challenge me when I asserted my
Black identity as a light-skinned person. Over time, I realized that I stood
in a unique position to witness how Blacks and Whites viewed one an-
other and I came to vehemently resent the latter's anti-dark bias toward
the former, which I fully acknowledged to be global in dimension.' I
understood this bias had also created an internalized defense mechanism
among Blacks against those favored with lighter skin.' Indeed, White fa-
voritism toward light-skinned persons has become so internalized and
entrenched within the Black community, in the form of resentment against
other Blacks of light complexion. But while I understood this resentment
and its source whenever I encountered it among friends and associates, I
nonetheless refused to engage in the house Negro/field Negro dichotomy
that often accompanied such resentment. Nonetheless it was clear that
when it came to other Blacks, I was even one step further removed from
racial acceptance, for I was not simply a light-skinned Black, but of mixed
lineage.
As you look upon my mocha skin with disdain
One ever feels one cognitive dichotomy,
One's invisibility--an ideological lopsidedness
With both "struggle" and "hegemony"
Coursing through his veins.
Far from intellectual curiosity is my pride and pain
103. MICHAEL OMI & HowARD WiNANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980s 62 (1986).
104. See, e.g., CARL DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELA-
TIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 98-112, 226 (1971) (noting a color caste
hierarchy in Brazil with dark-skinned Blacks at the bottom).
105. Cf. Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV.
1705 (2000); Leonard M. Baynes, f It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does
Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of




But I have fun with your social experiment,
Your "really who's Black game."
Yet no need to wonder, no cause for alarm
My color, culture and content
remain proudly intact and unharmed.
But on every occasion you are always the gracious host
"ho ostracizes to quell your demons
and appease your own ghosts."°
But just as often, my phenotypical reality opened up another world,
or some small part of it. Even being mistaken, and often treated as Latino
only confirmed that race matters. Because of my appearance, I also
experienced racial and ethnic discrimination from yet another vantage
point. Growing up, the words "spic" and "dumb El Salvadorian" were
epithets I quickly came to know. More than several times, before I took it
upon myself to learn Spanish, I was even regarded by Dominicans as a
"stuck up Puerto Rican who did not want to speak the language." I was
caught in the vortex of intergroup ethnic and racial animosity among
Latinos as well as from both Whites and Blacks.
So why would I, a person who has experienced hostility from
Whites and non-Whites, and who is himself both White and non-White,
ever advocate and embrace race consciousness? The point I make in re-
counting my mixed-race lineage and the complexity of identity and
complexion is this: despite its difficulty and inexactness, despite the multi-
dimensionality10 7 and intersectionalityy 8 a multiracial background does
not always eviscerate the need for monoracial classification schemes, but
rather, reinforces its continuing relevancy in the lives of multiracial per-
sons who are viewed in strictly monoracial terms. If that seems like a
contradiction infused with internal tension, then it is no less contradictory
than living daily in the "double consciousness" that both bi-racial and
Black persons experience."9 Added to this complexity remains the open
question of how one is to mesh multiraciality and race consciousness with
engagement in racial resistance. I address this question below.
106. Maurice Dyson, Mixed, in TRUTH AND TRIBULATION, SELECTED POEMS 10 (Maurice
R. Dyson &Terrence B. Page eds., 1999).
107. See generally Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "Intersectionality," "Multi-
dimensionality," and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH.J. RACE &
L. 285 (2001) [hereinafter Identity Crisis].
108. See, e.g., Kimberl& Williams Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antisubordination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, U. CH. LEGAL F. 139, 142-43 (1989).
109. See generally WE.B. Du Bois, THE SouLs OF BLACK FOLK (1903); FRxrz FANON,
BLACK SKIN,WHITE MASKS (1967).
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VI. MULTIRACIAL IDENTITY:THE DILEMMA
OF CLASSIFICATION AND RACIAL RESISTANCE
Some commentators haves suggested that racial identity is a prereq-
uisite for racial resistance.110 Darren Hutchinson, for example, suggests that
there exists "a symbiotic relationship between racial resistance and identity
formation,... two processes [that] are mutually reinforcing." ' 1 More spe-
cifically, he asserts that racial identity and consciousness "serves as a
prerequisites or catalyst for racial resistance.""' Although I agree these
spheres are mutually reinforcing, indeed symbiotic, I am less prepared to
say that racial identity, at least in all cases, serves as a prerequisite to racial
resistance. While Hutchinson recognizes that the Black Power Movement
was "the clearest example of how resistance to oppression fashions iden-
tity" it is clear in his successive passages for example that he, along with
other scholars, regards identity as shaped by "experiential knowledge"
which in turn becomes the basis for racial resistance to racial injustice."3
Indeed, I came to adopt my Black identity through struggle, a strug-
gle against being separated at times from my father and my mother,
simply because societal discrimination worked against their interracial
union. I also engaged in battles to dismantle academic tracking in my high
school-because I was a direct victim of it, the double standards in finan-
cial aid and need blind admissions in college, and cab drivers that did not
pick up college students such as myself. I also waged battle with other
forms of racial subordination without knowing that it was merely because
I had neither been accepted as Black, nor had I come to identify the cause
I was fighting for as a Black one. But soon thereafter I embraced my racial
identity, in large measure because others engaged in these battles finally
embraced me as one of their own. The social meaning of the struggle we
fought connected our faces to a collective soul.
Thus, if we acknowledge that race is socially constructed, we must
also come to accept that it can be formed by engagement that can and has
been socially regarded, at its essence, as racial resistance. The synergy of
multiple environmental factors can work in reverse to form the very
identity of the person who suddenly, or even gradually, finds himself in
the midst of its perfect storm. To be sure, this is not likely to be the case
110. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Critical Race Studies: Progressive Race Blind-
ness?: Individual Identity, Group Politics, and Reform, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1455, 1469 (2002)
[hereinafter Critical Race Studies] ("The progressive race blindness scholarship also blurs the
reality that racial consciousness or identity serves as a prerequisite or catalyst for racial
resistance. Persons of color have written extensively on how their racial identity--shaped
by experiences with subordination-gives them valuable 'experiential knowledge' for
challenging racial injustice.").
111. Id. at 1468.




all the time, or nearly all the time, since one can view the vicissitude of
life through a non-racially contextualized filter. But in some cases, these
experiences may wake the soul to embrace the reality of one's racial space
and identity within the world. As such, racial identity formation in limited
circumstances can be both externally reinforced and internally developed.
Essentially, although racial identity formation is typically a predicate to
racial resistance, this should not mean that it can never be the inverse.
As one of the multiracial persons on whose behalf Connerly suppos-
edly waged his RPI initiative, I must ultimately reject it. Whatever his
intent, the result would be clear for people of color. Thus, unlike progressive
colorblind theorists,' I embrace racial classification as the cornerstone for
accountability. However we come to identify ourselves, I believe that in
some, but certainly not all cases, challenging the material effects of dis-
crimination requires that we remain focused on race which in turn may
also facilitate racial identity formation. Indeed, a focus on the material
effects of inequality will only reinforce the relevance of racial classifica-
tions and the need for race conscious remedies."5
When all is said and done, the simple ironic truth is also all too
clear: Connerly was pushing for the elimination of racial data and calling
for the end of racial consideration just as the conservative U.S. Supreme
Court today now acknowledges the saliency of race.
A. The Dilemma of Classification and Racial Authenticity
Calling for a contextual review of the Michigan plan, the majority
of the Court noted that: "[j]ust as growing up in a particular region or
having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an individual's
views, so too is one's own, unique experience of being a racial minority
in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately still matters" 6
Connerly's initiative entirely missed this point in that, in its vehement
insistence to eliminate race, it represented a position not of colorblindness,
114. See, e.g., PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGINING POLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND
THE COLOR LINE 29 (2000); C. Christi Cunningham, The "Racing" Cause of Action and the
Identity Formally Known as Race: The Road to Tamazunchale, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 709
(1999); Richard T. Ford, Race As Culture? Wy Not?, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803, 1806
(2000); Hutchinson, Critical Race Studies, supra note 110 (discussing progressive color-
blindness scholarship and citing Reginald Leamon Robinson, The Shifting Race-
Consciousness Matrix and the Multiracial Category Movement: A Critical Reply to Professor
Hernhndez, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 231, 232-33 (2000)); Reginald Leamon Robin-
son, A Means of Preventing Escape from the Control of Her White Masters, 15 ToURO L. REV.,
401, 432-33 (1999).
115. See generally Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the ID,
the Ego, and Other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEo. L.J. 2279 (2001).
116. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003) (noting that racial preferences
must be viewed in context).
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but of hostility to race consciousness. '17 Implicit in the belief that race
consciousness vis- -vis racial classifications will have a negative impact is
that the racial categories which Connerly opposes will essentialize indi-
vidual groups by "falsely implying that they experience life at a unitary
location."""8 Colorblind theorists, such as Christi Cunningham, also view
race as a "malignant proxy" for community while Reginald Robinson, for
example, believes such classifications raise the unsavory question of what
is genuine or "authentic" Blackness.1"9 Beyond these concerns, there is also
the longstanding skepticism of the historical emphasis of race conscious-
ness which produced the negative regime of Jim Crow. However, this
skepticism is overly broad in that it fails to take adequate notice of the fact
that race consciousness can and has served the beneficial purpose of ad-
dressing racial inequity in many fields such as education." In this regard,
colorblind theorists' obfuscation of the distinction of racial classification as
a remedial measure from more distinct historically invidious classifications
is reminiscent of the Supreme Court's blurred articulation of a so-called
colorblind jurisprudence. 2 '
But for now, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the legitimate
role of race as embodied in the diversity rationale for affirmative action.
The Court's endorsement of the use of race, by extension, has also meant
the endorsement of racial classifications for all intents and purposes. But
query why the Court would pave the way for the further use of racial
classifications. No doubt, a number of theories will be espoused about
O'Connor's pivotal swing vote. My own belief is that at the very heart of
her opinion in Grutter is the notion of national legitimacy and security, as
well as the special role of education. This, I believe, can explain the
Court's affirmation of the ultimate role of race and the use of racial classi-
117. Cf Kimberlk Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation
and Legitimation inAntidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1378-79 (1988) ("Racial
hierarchy cannot be cured by the move to facial race-neutrality .... White race conscious-
ness, in a new form but still virulent, plays an important, perhaps crucial, role in the new
regime that has legitimated the deteriorating day-to-day material conditions of the major-
ity of Blacks.").
118. Hutchinson, Critical Race Studies, supra note 110, at 1461-62.
119. E. Christi Cunningham, The "Racing" Cause of Action and the Identity Formerly
Known As Race: The Road To Tamazunchale, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 707, 728 (1999); Reginald
Leamon Robinson, "Expert" Knowledge: Introductory Comments on Race Consciousness, 20
B.C.THIRD WORLD LJ. 145,160-63 (2000).
120. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also
Sylvia Hurtado, Linking Diversity and Educational Purpose: How Diversity Affects the Classroom
Environment and Student Development, in DIVERSITY CHALLENGED: EVIDENCE ON THE IMPACT
OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 187 (Gary Orfield & Michal Kurlaender eds., 2001); ROBERT M.
HUTCHINS, THE HIGHER LEARNING IN AMERICA 15,19 (1936).
121. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind," 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 53-55 (1991).
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fications in university admissions. Below I attempt to briefly elaborate on
this important point.
B. A New Purpose for Race and Racial Classification?
Justice O'Connor writes:
In order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes
of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race
and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must
have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educa-
tional institutions that provide this training.'22
Education is key to national legitimacy because, for O'Connor, it provides
the training ground for a diverse national leadership to develop. This di-
verse leadership in turn fosters a sense of legitimacy of a democratic
nation that reflects all of its citizens. 23 In addition to the legitimacy af-
forded by inclusiveness, O'Connor has a new argument for why the
University of Michigan should be permitted to maintain its admissions
policy, to wit: Race-based affirmative action is necessary to win the war
on terror. This idea is related to the first, since it is legitimacy that in turn
engenders security.The idea is that because racial diversity will ensure broad
legitimacy in a racially and ethnically diverse world, the face of America
will resemble its officer core (and other nations that have long seen their
interests diametrically opposed to our own). In this regard, the most effec-
tive amicus brief of all, particularly in view of the war in Iraq, was filed by a
group of twenty-nine retired military and civilian leaders, including
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, director of the allied forces in the 1991
Gulf War, Robert McFarlane, President Reagan's national security adviser,
Admiral William T Crowe, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
General Wesley Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. 124
These military officers also took note of the nexus between security and
racial diversity:
In the interest of national security, the military must be selec-
tive in admissions for training and education for the officer
corps, and it must train and educate a highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps in a racially diverse educational setting. It
122. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2341 (2003).
123. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312-13 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring) (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)) ("[Tlhe 'na-
tion's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to the ideas and mores
of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples.").
124. Brief of Amici Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W Becton, Jr., et al. at 29-30, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241).
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requires only a small step from this analysis to conclude that
our country's other most selective institutions must remain
both diverse and selective. Like our military security, our eco-
nomic security and international competitiveness depend upon
it. An alternative that does not preserve both diversity and se-
lectivity is no alternative at all.'25
If racial diversity vis-a-vis inclusive considerations of racial classifica-
tions matter for the Supreme Court and our nation's legitimacy and
security, how do progressive colorblind theorists attempt to reconcile their
attempts to destabilize racial classifications? Other colorblind theorists go
a step further in their contradiction by discounting racial classifications on
the one hand, while simultaneously relying upon race as a vehicle for so-
cial resistance or social control on the other. For example, as Hutchinson
observes, C. Christi Cunningham's writing indicates that she "wishes to
discard the identity quotient-but maintain race as a concept of shaping
political and equality movements.' 12 6 The fact that colorblind activists such
as Connerly make a specific allowance for racial classification for purposes
of police authority and racial oppression in the RPI calls into the ques-
tion the integrity and genuine intent of their professed colorblind agenda.
If, according to these military officers, legitimacy and security are
furthered by demonstrative racial inclusiveness, how is it then that legiti-
macy and security are best ensured in Connerly's RPI? It would appear
that there is not only a conspicuous difference between these camps in
what role race should play, but also a marked difference of opinion in the
inherent value of race in achieving legitimacy and security for our de-
mocratic republic. In the former, race is used to harness legitimacy and
security for the better good while in the latter, race is viewed as some-
thing so inimical to security that it must be controlled. In this sense it is
rather ironic that Connerly's call for the elimination of racial boxes actu-
ally leads to less freedom for people of color, not more.
In the final analysis, traditional critical race theorists, civil rights ad-
vocates, and other allies would do well to finally recognize the
importance of working together over the next twenty-five years to close
the race gap in education, health care, criminal law, employment, and
other important arenas of our social and political lives. Such cooperation
will be critical to make race less salient and less determinative of educa-
tional, economic, and political resources and opportunities. Likewise,
whatever differences remain between people of color, be they monoracial,
multiracial, critical race, or progressive, one might concede that Tanya
Hernindez's call for race consciousness within the monoracial
Black/White paradigm is in its most fundamental terms, a call for racial
125. Id.
126. Hutchinson, Critical Race Studies, supra note 110, at 1463.
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solidarity among Blacks and multiracials. Cornel West once described this
approach to racial solidarity as "racial reasoning."' 27 For West, racial rea-
soning is the notion that Black people, in order to lend strength to the
struggle of equality, must close ranks and speak with one voice. 2 How-
ever, for West, racial reasoning is unsatisfying primarily because it
produces Black leaders that focus solely on pigmentation instead of quali-
fication and reasoning.'
29
I also find difficulties with the racial reasoning concept, given that
my racial identity was inextricably tied to a limited societal construction
of race solely based upon my own pigmentation. Indeed, such a narrow
conception of race vis-a'-vis pigmentation obviously contradicts the mul-
tidimensionality of people of color; it has undoubtedly played a role in
my own marginalization within both the Black and White communities.
To be sure, racial reasoning has other negative consequences. It is, after all,
this type of reasoning, according to West, that led to the confirmation and
ascendancy of Justice Clarence Thomas and his radically anti-progressive
colorblind agenda. As West states:
Thomas's claim to racial authenticity [is] his birth in Jim Crow
Georgia, his childhood spent as the grandson of a [B]lack
sharecropper, his undeniably [B]lack phenotype degraded by
racist ideals of beauty, and his gallant [B]lack struggle for
achievement in racist America. Second, the complex relation of
this claim to racial authenticity to the increasing closing-ranks
mentality in [B]lack America. Escalating [B]lack-nationalist
sentiments-the notion that America's will to racial justice is
weak and therefore [B]lack people must close ranks for sur-
vival in the hostile [W]hite country-rests principally upon
claims to racial authenticity .... Most [B]lack leaders got lost
in this thicket of reasoning and thus got caught in a vulgar
form of racial reasoning: [B]Iack authenticity-[B]lack
127. Cornel West, Black Leadership and the Pitfalls of Racial Reasoning, in RACE-ING
JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CON-
STRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 390 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992).
128. Id.
129. Id. West suggests:
The fundamental aim of this undermining and dismantling is to replace
racial reasoning with moral reasoning, to understand the [B]lack-freedom
struggle not as an affair of skin pigmentation and racial phenotype but rather
as a matter of ethical principles and wise politics, and to combat [B]lack-
nationalist views of subordinating the issues and interests of [Bilack women
by linking mature [Bilack self-love and self-respect to egalitarian relations
within and outside [B]lack communities. The failure of nerve of [Bilack
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closing-ranks mentality-[B]lack male subordination of
[B]lack women in the interests of the [B]lack community in a
hostile [W]hite-racist country. 130
Thus, while Hernindez calls for the abolition of the MCM because she
believes it will promote pigmentocracy, she fails to see that her proposal
for such an abolition only succumbs to another invidious form of racial
reasoning. Moreover, she fails to show how such an abolition would radi-
cally alter the status quo in this respect. Theoretically, the end of the
MCM will hardly mean that the current pigmentocracy will no longer
exist, nor does it necessarily mean that racial justice will be served. In the
end, I therefore must respectfully disagree with this portion of
Hernindez's important thesis because as the foregoing discussion illus-
trates, over-reliance on pigmentation will always cheat the cause of racial
justice.
However, on the other end of the spectrum, there are those who
suggest that in order to lend strength to the struggle of equality, we not
close ranks, but instead expand them. For example, Lani Guinier and Gerald
Torres, recently expressed optimism for successful multiracial coalition
building by constructing collective identity and cause under the banner of
"political race" '131 "Political race" begins by using the societal construction
of racial identity as a method by which to organize non-minorities. This is
achieved by demonstrating how the needs of the racial minorities overlap
with non-minorities as to implicate threats to the common good.'32 In
short, Guinier and Torres are concerned with the very issues inherent in
multiracial coalition building that Derrick Bell confronted in his oft-cited
interest convergence dilemma. 3  But as Cheryl Harris queries, we must
wonder whether "political race intervention ... moved us through race to
class, or is it an intervention that leaves crucial aspects of racial
130. Id. at 391-92.
131. See LANi GUINIER & GERALD ToRRs, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER,ThANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11-12 (2002).
132. Andrew E.Taslitz, The New Data: Over-Representation of Minorities in The Criminal
Justice System: Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data With the Power To Inspire Politi-
calAction, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 282 (2003). According to Taslitz:
The key point is that the political race idea, if correct, optimistically asserts
that the circle of the sympathetic can be widened based on a strategy of por-
traying a threat to the common good. The anxiety raised by novel
information given to otherwise uninformed [W]hites may therefore help to
foster [Wihite willingness to embrace a new view of America as, in part, a
racial polity.
Id.
133. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and The Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980).
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disadvantages still to be addressed?" '134 According to Harris, the answer
appears to lie in the latter concern, since class itself is organized in racial
terms that may lead to neglect of specific disadvantages affecting racial
minorities. 3 '
Consequently, we remain without an adequate theory of social resis-
tance that can both recognize racial identity in general and multiracial
identity in particular, while at the same time working for racial justice
without either resorting to superficial reliance on pigmentation or mar-
ginalizing the interests of racial minorities.
CONCLUSION
It is ostensibly clear that race will not lose its significance for quite
some time. Even Justice Thomas remains skeptical of the ability of univer-
sities to eliminate any racial inequity, noting that in twenty-five years,
affirmative action "policies will clearly have failed to 'eliminate the [per-
ceived] need for any racial or ethnic' discrimination because the academic
credentials gap will still be there."136 Consequently, Connerly's initiative
highlights not only that data analysis is critical for the enforcement of
substantive rights, but that race conscious intervention is necessary to
eradicate the enduring legacy of race conscious oppression that gives rise
to this inequity. However, colorblind theorists and political race theorists
alike should take caution that racial equality is not undermined by either
a restrictive or narrow deference to race, as in the case of the former, or
through an expansive definition of racial identity vis-i-vis political race
identity, as in the case of the latter.
Neither ignoring the saliency of race, as Connerly does, nor encom-
passing poor Whites in a multiracial coalition, as Guinier and Torres
envision, will necessarily lead to progress for racial minorities or the re-
claiming of race-based scholarships, race-based financial aid, or race-based
enrichment programs such as those recently abandoned at MIT 37 and
134. Cheryl I. Harris, Mining in Hard Ground the Miner's Canary, 116 HAav. L. REv.
2487, 2529 (2002) (book review).
135. Id.
136. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2365 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Nathanson & Bartnika, The Constitutionality of Prefer-
ential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 CmI. B. REc. 282, 293
(1977)).
137. The Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights initiated an investigation
after two anti-affirmative action advocacy groups, the Center for Equal Opportunity and
the American Civil Rights Institute, sent a letter to MIT alleging that its two
summer programs were illegal because they limited enrollment to underrepresented
minorities. Marcella Bombardieri, MIT Drops a Policy For Minorities, at http://
www.aad.english.ucsb.edu/docs/mitll.html (Feb. 11, 2003); cf Catherine L. Horn &
Stella M. Flores, Percent Plans in College Admissions: A Comparative Analysis of Three States'
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elsewhere for fear of being sued by White constituents. For the reasons
articulated above, racial reasoning is not an entirely satisfactory solution to
building racial solidarity either. Whatever theories of solidarity and racial
identity we adopt, in order to be truly effective, it is incumbent upon any
movement to:
1. recognize the continuing need for racial classification for
purposes of governmental accountability;
2. incorporate consideration of the increasing presence of
multiracial identity and the specific role it will undoubt-
edly play in the future;
3. leverage broader influence upon constituents other than
racial minorities by drawing upon the guiding principle
of mutual self interest while adequately addressing the
real materialist consequences of under-represented racial
minorities.
These three elements are essential to any new theory of resistance that is
centered around racial identity and classification, but are often not ade-
quately addressed.
Regardless of whether the consideration of race legally ceases to be
a factor to promote diversity by June 23, 2028, as the Supreme Court rec-
ommended, the growing hostility to racial categorization may mean that
racial categorization will eventually cease to survive, legally or politically,
except in marginal contexts. When this happens, so-called colorblind ju-
risprudence may very well be the default rule of law. By then, all the
wrangling and debate over what role race should now play will ultimately
become constitutionally obsolete. ' Because that fateful day draws near
we must finally recognize the time is now to act, and to act decisively.
Experiences 55, 59 (2003), at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/
affirmativeaction/tristate.pdf.
138. It is questionable whether the Court's language in Grutter prohibiting the use of
race for purposes of diversity in twenty-five years is binding or merely dicta, albeit persua-
sive dicta by six members of the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff, The Supreme
Court's Divided Rulings in the University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases: What Does it All
Mean?, at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ dorf/20030625.html (June 25, 2003). Conceiva-
bly, one can argue that the Court's language does not speak directly to the case at hand,
although it is an important factor in O'Connor's narrow tailoring analysis. It is true, how-
ever, that the Court's recommended deadline on racial considerations will have important
implications nonetheless.
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